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1 There is nothing new about the idea that socialism or nationalism might bring about a
revolutionary regeneration of the human and social body, and it no doubt reaches back
to the time of the French Revolution (Ozouf 1989: 116-157).1 After the First World War
this idea became widespread in Europe, and was at least partially applied by fascist
regimes and in the Soviet Union (Batard-Bonucci; Milza 2004; Pennetier; Pudal 2002).
From the 1920s and especially early 1930s onwards, the Italian and Soviet models also
acted as the inspiration for various tendencies within Turkish nationalism that were
looking to create their own versions of the New Man (Aydın 2003; Irem 2002). Since
then,  and  independently  or  not  of  these  experiences,  the  number  of  political  and
religious movements and political regimes to have been influenced by theories about
the regeneration of man is so large that it would be pointless to seek to list them all.
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2 Frequently it has been states that have constructed these theories and put them into
practice, and so they tend to have been analysed in terms of totalitarianism and its
official  ideologies.  Research has  concentrated  on  the  state  policies  of  totalitarian
regimes,  even  though  the  idea  of  the  regeneration  of  man  through  revolution  is
frequently present in numerous political parties and movements not (yet) in power,
and  sometimes  even  put  into  practice  by  them.2 The  upshot  has  been  a  certain
insistence on the myth of the New Man and on the associated ideas, beliefs, rites, and
aesthetics,  within  a  specifically  ‘authoritarian’  context,  and  this  arguably  at  the
expense  of  studying  small-scale  measures  seeking  to  bring  about  concrete
transformations at the level of the individual.3
3 The perspective adopted here seeks to make up for this oversight. The analysis has
been  deliberately  restricted  to  a  single  movement  so  as  to  bring  the  relationship
between theory and practice into sharper focus, and especially to more fully assess the
concrete effects of a single specific doctrine and how activists apply it. One of the main
contributions  of  the  sociology  of  collective  action  is  to  have  shown  that  it  is  not
possible to infer a movement’s repertoire of action from the ideology it develops,4 but this
does not hold good for internal activist practices (roles, value-attitude systems, means of
personal involvement, and so on) which, as part of a radical organisation devising a
project  for  a  counter-society,  are  less  dependent  on the  external  environment.5 By
studying  the  example  of  the  relationship  between  the  belief  system  and  activist
practice in the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK),6 this article seeks to demonstrate how a
specific theory of the New Man translated into practice for many of the organisation’s 
activists, to the point where over 200 of them have voluntarily sacrificed themselves to
their party’s cause (by self-immolation and by carrying out suicide attacks).
4 This article, without seeking to account for such extreme instances7 or view the PKK via
preconceived  categories,8 starts  by  analysing  the  discourse  produced  by  the  main
Kurdish movement organisation in Turkey so as to better understand how a certain
imaginative construction of the New Man emerged. It then draws on written works and
journals  kept  by former combatants,  activists,  and party sympathisers  to  study the
disciplinary mechanisms used to put this theory into practice in the various branches
of the organisation. The results of an interview study are then presented, conducted
with forty-odd PKK activists and sympathisers in Europe, some still actively involved,
others  not,  so  as  to  try  to  evaluate  the  effectiveness  of  this  ‘coercive  architecture’
(Grojean; Küçük 2006: 68).9 Without going into their personal trajectories in detail, the
aim is both to identify certain factors that can help explain why they seek to model
their lives on an ideal put forward by the PKK leader, and to analyse how individuals
handle the dissatisfactions and disappointments attendant upon their involvement in
the institution.10
 
I. The theory of the New Man 
Communism, nationalism, and the New Man
5 The  PKK,  a  participant  in  the  Kurdish  movement  in  the  Middle  East,  very  clearly
positions itself within a nationalist project. In opposition to Turkish nationalism, which
held that Anatolia is the cradle of Turkishness and affirms that Kurds are ‘mountain
Turks’ and the Kurdish language in fact a sub-language of Turkish, Kurdist groups and
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the PKK put forward a nationalism literally constructed as its ‘mirror image,’ with its
own  symbols  (the  Kurdistan  flag  -  even  if  the  PKK  has  its  own  ‘national’  flag  -,
geographical map, and so on, cf. O’Shea 1994), its own myths (Newroz, celebrating the
revolt of Kawa the blacksmith against the tyrant Dahhak; the Medes, from whom the
Kurds declare they are descended),11 its own heroes (the leaders of the 1930s revolts,
and leaders of the PKK and Öcalan), and its own traitors and martyrs (Strohmeier 2003).
6 And like all nationalisms, this one comes with its own unique historiography, seeing
the Kurdish revolts as part of the age-old repression of the Kurdish people – whereas
they are in fact primarily a revolt against the state qua state – with the PKK (at least)
affirming that Turkish, Arab, and Persian colonisation amount to a deliberate project to
alienate the Kurdish nation. The social,  linguistic, and religious fragmentation to be
found in Kurdish-majority regions in Turkey means that the populations need to be
unified around a feeling of belonging, a feeling of Kurdishness, that is to say an entity
larger than tribe, religion, or language.
7 But whilst nationalism provides a perspective on the past and a goal for the future, it is
not particularly concerned with the present and so necessarily runs the risk of being
seen  as  too  particular  where  what  is  needed  to  mobilise  people  is  a  certain
universalism,  an  economic  model  to  be  put  into  practice,  and  a  societal  project
(Bozarslan 1997: 115-116).  And so like numerous other political organisations in the
1960s and 1970s in the Middle East, the PKK therefore adopted Marxism-Leninism as a
‘borrowed doctrine.’  But  whilst  for  some parties  this  ideology acted primarily  as  a
veneer that soon flaked off (such as for the KDP in Iraq), for Öcalan’s party it acted as a
stock  of  ideas,  means,  and  projects,  and  thus exerted  a  strong  influence  over  its
combat. 
8 The PKK’s first text published in 1978, The Path of the Revolution in Kurdistan - Manifesto
(Kurdistan  Devrimin  Yolu  -  Manifesto)  resembles  the  programme  of  any  national
liberation movement drawing on Marxist arguments. The first part of the work (on the
history of class society and colonialism) frequently refers to the ‘materialist conception
of  history,’  ‘scientific  socialism,’  ‘class  struggle,’  and  ‘surplus  value,’  for  instance
(Özcan, 2006:  100),  whilst the second and third parts deal with Kurdish society,  the
enslavement of the Medes, and the colonisation of Kurds in terms of ‘the exploitation of
Kurdistan’ by the ‘Turkish bourgeoisie’ and its ‘feudal collaborators’ (PKK 1986).12
9 These ideological references are significant for they influenced the direction the PKK
struggle  took in  the  1980s  and 1990s.  But  alone they do not  suffice  to  explain  the
emergence within the party of a theory of the New Man. It is true that these references
perhaps make it easier to sacralise the party leader than others might (thanks to the
theory of the avant-garde), and to legitimate the current combat (by mobilising
historical references and supposedly scientific concepts). But all the Kurdist parties in
Turkey in the late 1970s had a very similar ideological discourse.
 
The New Man and counter-society
10 One way a group can differentiate itself – other than highlighting frequently obscure
theoretical differences with other political currents – is to focus more on the core of
the organisation, without paying much heed to how discourse is received outside the
organisation, especially since in the late 1970s the vast majority of the population of
south-east Turkey was not at all receptive to Marxist vocabulary. Frontiers of group
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belonging  are  delineated  by  imposing  specific  practices  (relating  to  dress,  hair,
language,  etc.)  reinforcing  collective  cohesion  and  homogeneity.  For  the  PKK,  the
heightened commitment of its activists made up for its weak resources (Dorronsoro;
Grojean 2004):13 before the 1980 coup, it was the only truly clandestine organisation,
that is to say structured like a military body into separate units, within which activists
were functioning as  ‘professional  revolutionaries’ with full-time involvement in the
struggle.
11 But whilst its clandestine status and concomitant strict rules no doubt made it possible
for part of the PKK to survive in exile, this was not enough to prevent denunciations,
betrayals, and infiltrations resulting in the arrest of hundreds of party members after
12 September. These setbacks were compounded by internal opposition and the setting
up of Korucu militia (village guards who were paid and armed by the state) in 1985. For
the party leadership, the only way of preventing internal dissent and betrayals was
supervision and training. In the mid-1980s, the various components of the ERNK (Eniya
Rizgarîya Netewayi Kurdistan, National Liberation Front of Kurdistan) set up to supervise
and train the population, the founding of the Akademîya Mahsum Korkmaz in charge of
the political and military education of combatants, and the introduction of obligatory
military service and a penal system within the organisation, may all be interpreted as
attempts to curb these centripetal tendencies (Çelik 2002: 60, 109). The PKK’s Marxism
and nationalism were subsequently adapted to these issues.
12 The first work to refer to the ‘personality’ of the Kurds came out in 1983 (Öcalan 1983),
but  the  question  of  the  individual  only  became central  to  Öcalan’s  writings  in  the
following  years  when  guerrilla  training  started  in  Lebanon.  The  notions  of  ‘
humanisation,’  ‘socialisation,’  ‘individual  emancipation’ (özgürleşme),  ‘self,’  and  ‘
liberated  personality’  progressively  replaced  the  classical  Marxist  notions  of  ‘class
struggle’ and ‘historical materialism’ (Öcalan 1986: 17, quoted in Özcan 2006: 109). ‘Self-
production,’ that is to say the generation of a virtuous personality liberated from both
Turkish alienation and alienation by traditional social structures and so worthy of the
guide’s  trust,  progressively  became  the  only  path  offered  to  activists  in  the
Çözümlemeler (Analyses), lectures given by Öcalan himself at the Academy:14
Our revolution, initially ideological, political, and military in nature, is increasingly
becoming a social one. That transforms peoples’ lives a lot more and so produces
major results and strong reactions. This is an uprising against the old social order –
against the world of socialisation, relations, feelings, and impulses developed by the
enemy. We are seeking to destroy this world (Öcalan 1997a: 35).
13 This shift in intellectual direction is of course related to the ‘New Man’ that the Soviet
Communist Party wished to create, but it also needs to be seen in relationship with
Kurdish historiography in the 1920s and 1930s. Kurdish nationalism - working against
Turkish historiography which was promoted to the status of a state ideology after 1923
(see Copeaux 1997) - bears the imprint of social Darwinism and racial anthropology,
and draws on the repression of numerous Kurdish revolts in the 1920s and 1930s. It is
based on the idea of a struggle for the survival of the race and on the premise of a
biological nation made up of individual cells – some healthy, others not – building up
an alternative narrative by reworking the themes of unity and of the enemy within
found in Turkish historiography (Bozarslan 2001).15
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The characteristics of the New Man 
14 The  resultant  concept  of  the  New  Man  (Yeni İnsan)  is  thus  far  removed  from  the
Platonic  philosophy  of  the  subject  or  that  of  Touraine,  as  Ali  Kemal  Özcan  rather
complacently suggests (Özcan 2006: 111):
The new man does not drink, does not gamble, never thinks of his own personal
pleasure or comfort, and there is nothing feminine about him, and those who [in
the past] indulged in such activities will, sharp as a knife, cut out all these habits as
soon as he or she is among new men. The new man’s philosophy and morality, the
way he sits and stands, his style, ego, attitude and reactions [tepki] are his and his
alone. The basis of all these things is his love for the revolution, freedom, country,
and socialism, a love that is as solid as a rock. Applying scientific socialism to the
reality of our country creates the new man. (Üçlü 1996: 21).
15 The Kurds thus need to be ‘socially’ educated and persuaded ‘that they are slaves and
need  to  be  liberated’  (Bozarslan  1997:  106).  This  applies  to  activists  more  than  to
anyone else, for they always run the risk of betraying the cause through lack of faith or
discipline:
‘The enemy plays with youth and its impulses. And it is ready to fight, ready for
every danger and all your difficulties. The enemy plays with you. And so you have
to be very careful. If you accept to say: “I am in good faith, and will adhere to the
principles of the party and of a free life”, then you will stand out for your good
behaviour. Otherwise you are a danger, with your behaviour serving one knows not
who. That is why political, military, and ideological training are insufficient, and
what is needed is social education. When you hear people speak of social education
do not think that you are meant to ask yourself whether you are “a well-behaved
daughter  or  a  good  son.”  Such  people  are  perhaps  the  least  educated.  Social
education is  in  fact  about  taking steps  against  the influence of  the enemy,  and
taking steps against outmoded social debris [...] and, most importantly, about giving
concrete  form within one’s  personality  to  the  aims of  the  revolution –  be  they
political, social, economic, or cultural – in short, what a healthy society needs. That
is  what  social  education is.  You will  progress  in  this  area  until  you become an
activist with a social objective. Being an activist is not enough. You need to be a
social activist.  What is a social activist? A social activist is someone who has an
absolutely revolutionary character in his or her everyday relations with others.’
(Öcalan 1997b: 42)
16 But  what  counts,  even  more  than  being  faithful  to  the  party’s  principles,  is  being
faithful to Öcalan in person, on which the cause and a better life are both founded. It is
by following his example – but without imitating him – that one can become a good
activist and a New Man worthy of the name:
‘Many of you resemble the dead. Life does not touch you. Your passion and joy are
very weak, your awareness insufficient, your hearts closed. You have strayed from
sensitivity  and  responsibility,  and  turned  towards  an  interest  that  is  not  the
necessary interest. We are different. The problem is bringing you up to the same
level [as ours]. It is possible, and you have to believe in it. All our example can do is
encourage you. You should not try to imitate our personality, but set out on the
path of your own development. You do not need to imitate. There are impressive,
enlightened ways to take you where you need to go.’ (Öcalan 1997a: 35)
17 And  above  and  beyond  the  disciplined way  of  living  evidenced  here,  the  main
instrument for transforming Man is ‘holy’ or ‘sacred’ war. This mystique of violence is
based on ‘the liberating step whereby the colonised, adopting violent means against an
all-powerful  order  and  master,  effects  a  radical  break  with  the  inferior  position
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previously assumed. He thereby rediscovers his dignity and identity which had been
obliterated by colonialism’ (Chaliand 1991: 23). Violence is promoted to the status of
fountainhead ‘of each society, as well as of each of its cells’ (quoted in Bozarslan 1997:
219). By inverting the process of traumatisation and stigma, it creates a new and better
man (Sartre 1991: 51, 54), and is even more effective insofar as this ‘war has [also] been
waged within, within the party and within the people.’16 
18 If we add to this the fact that the interest accorded to the issue of women – which also
emerged  in  1986-1987  after  the  Central  Committee  sidelined  Öcalan’s  wife,  Kesire
Yıldırım – is  part  of  a  desire to control  gender and sexual  relations (Grojean 2008:
504-513; Grojean 2013a),17 it becomes clearer to just what extent the theory of the New
Man is different from an ideology in the strict sense of the word, and is in fact closer to
an ideal way of life requiring self-analysis and self-development, a political imaginative
construction  seeking  to  bring  about  a  radical  transformation  of  the  habitus of
committed  individuals  in  the  here  and  now.18 For  various  surveillance,  control,  and
repression measures have been set up within the branches of the institution so as to
ensure these principles are correctly implemented.
 
II. Measures to educate, control, and repress 
19 Like  other  institutions,  the  PKK  sees  itself  primarily  as  a  teaching  and  even  an
educational  organisation insofar  as  its  officials  and ‘Leadership’  (Önderlik,  the name
given to Öcalan) are permanently working to bring practice into line with discourse.
Whilst it is certainly the case that ‘any institution [...] only takes on concrete form in
the commitment [of its members],’ the idea that ‘the effect members have on practices
does more to alter them than instructions laid down by leaders’ (Lagroye 2006: 50, 65) –
or to put the same idea differently, discourse and ideas only serve to rationalise, justify,
and  lend  legitimacy  to  pre-existing  practices  -  needs  here  to  be  nuanced.  Activist
practices  within the PKK are heavily  dependent upon Öcalan’s  Çözümlemeler,  which,
though to some extent tending to rationalise the daily constraints of war and the PKK’s
clandestine status, also initiate new ways of acting and thinking. The aim truly is to
create a miniature counter-society to serve as a model for Kurdish society and perhaps
even influence the whole world.
 
Training in the Mahsum Korkmaz Academy
20 This undertaking is furthered by the Mahsum Korkmaz Academy, which was founded in
Helve in the Bakaa valley in Lebanon in 1986,  before moving to Syria in 1993 near
Damas, and then to Iraq’s Kurdish region in 1998 where it still is. Between 1986 and
1998,  it  is  believed  that  over  10,000  party  activists  and  commanders  attended  this
‘school’ for training sessions lasting about three months or some longer re-education
programmes lasting several years. But despite this large figure it would be wrong to
think that all guerrillas trained in this Academy. From the early 1990s onwards most
young recruits were trained in their combat unit, especially during winter when there
are fewer clashes with the Turkish army. In 1991 training included a political aspect
lasting  two  months  and  a  military  part  lasting  one  month  (Arbeitskreis
Internationalismus Bonn et al. 1991: 7), attended by a ‘platform’ of between 100 and 250
activists. In the 1990s, on arriving new members take an oath of loyalty to the party,
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martyrs, leader, and cause, and are given a new first name (frequently a Kurdish one),
intended both to prevent any repression and symbolise their desire and commitment to
starting a new life (Flach 2003: 22).
21 ‘Trainees’ often had busy days (10 to 12 hours of classes) leaving little free time. They
rose at six and assembled for roll call to salute and proclaim the maxim ‘ya serfketin, ya
naman’ (freedom or death). Sometimes there was an hour’s sport before breakfast at
seven, and lessons started at eight and run through to lunchtime. Most of them were in
Turkish,  even  though  there  were  sometimes  parallel  sessions  in  Kurdish.  Classes
started again at 2pm and went through to the evening meal at 8pm. The evening was
either taken up by other training sessions, or else free time (football - often with Öcalan
- volley-ball, and Kurdish dances on special occasions). This typical day was subject to
considerable variation,  when for instance there were leadership elections,  a  special
address by Öcalan, talks – on resistance in prison after the 12 September for instance –
or  else  an  exercise  simulating  an  attack  by  the  Turkish  armed forces  (Arbeitskreis
Internationalismus Bonn et al. 1991: 8-11).
22 Whilst the subjects covered in class were varied,19 trainees were repeatedly reminded
that ‘90% of the combat is against your old personality, the enemy within, and only 10%
against the external enemy’ (Flach 2003: 22). Until 1998 Abdullah Öcalan himself taught
his Çözümlemeler every two or three days, and his lectures generally lasted between four
and seven hours, given without notes and without any breaks. Most of the time what he
had to say was based on concrete examples from his own life, and especially his youth,
intended to reveal how to foster a new personality (Solina 1997: 327). He would then
criticise  activists  whose  PKK  personality  was  insufficiently  developed  (PKKleşme),
before questioning them so as to get them to adopt a clear position.
23 The trainees then started their self-criticism just after Öcalan’s lesson, and often in his
presence. They were asked what they lesson they had drawn from Öcalan’s lecture (and
if they were not willing to answer could be deemed to be hiding something), what they
took away from it about their own behaviour, and how they intended to improve. This
mainly involved looking for what in their ‘former life’ was still operative and blocking
the emergence of a new personality. Other activists who knew the person who had just
presented their self-criticism then spoke to confirm or invalidate their self-analysis,
using categories such as ‘feudal,’ ‘petit-bourgeois,’ ‘career-oriented,’ ‘patriarchal,’ ‘12
September,’ or ‘convict.’20 It was generally very severely frowned upon to react in an
‘emotional and ill-thought out way’ to this criticism, and the reasons underlying this
behaviour  were  then  immediately  discussed  (Solina  1997:  333).  Displaying  any
opposition to the idea of male-female relations set out by the trainer could cause a real
scandal and result in the lesson being suspended (Çürükkaya 1997: 89). Öcalan or the
trainer  present  would  then assess  progress  made by  the  activist,  highlighting  both
areas of success and where further effort was needed.
 
Criticism, self-criticism, and behavioural compliance 
24 This  specific  phase  of  self-criticism  and  criticism  spread  to  other  areas  of  the
Academy’s  social  life,  during  elections  to  camp  leadership,  for  instance,  (the
commanders  were  criticised  by  Öcalan,  and  then  had  to  conduct  their  own  self-
criticism), or when problems occurred within a unit (criticism and self-criticism by a
small  group).  But  whilst  criticism  of  the  commanders  and  activists  was  deemed
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necessary,  any criticism of  Abdullah  Öcalan was  still  impossible.  Self-criticism thus
rapidly became the main instrument for normalising discourse, as of 1986 and the 3rd
Party  Congress.  As  Annie  Kriegel  suggests  in  relation  to  communist  systems,  ‘self-
criticism has the potential to be a healthy form of critical analysis of oneself [...], but in
practice it is a confession where what the audience expects to hear is not the analysis of
some error but the revelation of  a  fault  of  some sort,  and so it  generally produces
humiliation’ (Kriegel 1972: 92). The confession is thus a mark of submission, and the
proclamations  of  allegiance and love that  go with it  –  where the form is  far  more
important than the content – are meant to act as a guarantee of the activist’s adhesion
to the party and its leader.
25 But it  would be incorrect to think that the Leadership stops at words and bases its
judgement of activists’ progress purely on what they say. The Çözümlemeler need to be
applied, and this should result in the activists renouncing both their former life (they
are  obliged  to  cut  ties  with  their  family,  spouse,  children,  friends,  and so  on)  and
certain attitudes and habits. They are for instance not allowed to cross their legs (only
Öcalan  is  allowed  to  do  that),  to  make  hand  gestures  when  speaking  (Öcalan’s
privilege), or to sit before being instructed to do so (attitudes typical of the ‘enemy’s
style,’  cf.  Çürükkaya  1997:  80,  83). Drinking  alcohol,  smoking  tobacco,  and  having
sexual or even purely platonic relationships are also forbidden, as ‘recommended’ by
Öcalan in his talks.21 If it is born in mind that the Academy is also a military institution
where everyone must stand up straight and be dressed in the same way without any
distinctive signs (which would be evidence of an individualistic personality influenced
by  consumer  society),  it  becomes  clear  that  this  physical  and  linguistic  discipline
partakes  in  a  genuine  desire  to  transform  the  habitus of  the  individuals,  and  thus
complies with the theory of the New Man.
26 Various means are in place to regularly test the progress made by activists. At the end
of training they write a self-critical report, which is often presented and debated in
public.  If  their  self-criticism is  judged insufficient,  they may be obliged to  produce
another report, further training may be imposed, or a trial be held. The Academy has
its own tribunal in charge of judging deviant personalities, and those appearing before
the tribunal are held apart in a special building prior to trial to reflect on their acts.22 If
the assembly considers the ‘culprit’s’  personality to be susceptible to improvement,
then the judgment may be lenient, but it can also be very severe and even result in the
death penalty if the person is found guilty of having had a relationship with a member
of the opposite sex or of  having betrayed the party’s  principles.  Judgement is  then
either  be  followed by  an execution or  else  commuted to  a  less  severe  sentence by
Öcalan  himself  (Çürükkaya  1997:  106,  115,  118-119,  146,  159-170).  Selim  Çürükkaya
states that over 50 people were executed between 1985 and 1992.23
 
Generalisation of discipline to other branches of the institution
27 The  way  the  Mahsum  Korkmaz  Academy  works  is  of  course  not  necessarily  an
indication  of  how  the  PKK  functions  as  a  whole.  The  Academy  is  a  strictly  closed
military institution where what activists do is controlled 24 hours a day, and where
proximity  to  the  ‘Leadership’  makes  it  possible  to  denounce  and  reprehend  any
slippage in behaviour. Nevertheless, the desire to homogenise the habitus is found in
the  other  branches  of  the  party  too.  The  highly  centralised  structure  of  the
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organisation and Abdullah Öcalan’s place within it (‘Öcalan is nowhere, he is in the
heart of every Kurd’ commander Kanı Yılmaz observed just after the PKK leader was
captured), along with the use of certain modern means of communication, have made it
possible  to  try  to  reproduce  the  educational  system  of  the  Akademîya  Mahsum
Korkmaz outside the Bekaa valley in Lebanon. Academy trainees, guerillas, prisoners in
Turkey,  and  political  activists  in  Europe  are  thus  all  subjected  to  frequently  very
similar  rules,  even  though  their  social  and  political  contexts  are  objectively  very
different.24
28 This  system  was  no  doubt  initially  developed  among  the  guerrillas.  ‘Statutory’
timetables were introduced, especially in winter which is better suited to training: an
early rise, sometimes a bit of sport, four hours of theoretical lessons in the morning
followed by three hours of military training in the afternoon, discussion of the day’s
training between 6pm and 8pm, and finally free time before lights out at 9pm (Cigerli;
Le Saout 2005: 147). A high degree of self-discipline is clearly expected, justified by the
context of permanent danger: no complaints are allowed since ‘it would sap the morale
of the combatants,’ sexual relations are forbidden as is the fact of being alone with one
or several men for women, alcohol consumption is forbidden (as was smoking following
a  subsequent  decision  by  the  ‘Leadership’),  it  is  obligatory  to  take  part  in  various
activities,  and  desertion  is  of  course  forbidden  (Flach  2003:  41,  128,  193,  57).  Self-
criticism plays a considerable part in daily life and, as at the Academy, is carried out at
various times and in various circumstances (primarily Tekmîl and the Assembly.  Cf.
Licht am Horizont: 183-184). Anja Flach, a German Internationalist who spent two years
as a guerrilla, refers to it at least 22 times in her work (Flach 2003: 27, 42, 46, 81, 101,
110, 120, 136, 141, 163, 169, 177, 186, 190, 192, 199, 225, 232, 237, 247, 262, 272).
29 But PKK norms and rules have also been exported to Turkish prisons where prisoners,
held in groups of 30 to 100 people of similar political tendency, are controlled by the
organisation  that  is  theoretically  closest  to  them.  ‘Political’  dormitories  were
introduced in the late 1970s so as to avoid clashes between radical left- and right-wing
prisoners. This practice, which was continued and reinforced by political organisations
in  the  1980s,  has  resulted  in  a  sort  of  contracting  out  of  the  prison  order  to
organisations (Massicard 2002: 170-171). It is thus wholly possible to live according to
the Academy rhythm when in prison, and to be subjected to a very similar discipline,
which is in fact all the more stringent due to the fact of being imprisoned (the strict
separation of men and women, for instance)25 and the arbitrary nature of prison life
(after having been tortured during custody, submitting to an organisation can seem to
offer a guarantee against further harsh treatment).
30 Lastly, the wish to circumscribe the activists’ lives is not limited to the Middle East, and
the PKK has also sought to impose its life code and theory of the New Man on officials
in  Europe.  The  daily  routine  of  an  ERNK  activist  in  Germany  or  France  differs
substantially of course from that of a prisoner or combatant. But, as in the Middle East,
young recruits are obliged to follow two to three months of political training (there is
no military training in Europe). Those who remain in European countries are subject to
the same rules that apply in the Academy or to guerrillas,  with alcohol and sexual
relations being strictly  forbidden,  strict  standards of  dress  applied,  and self-critical
reports presented to an ‘interrogation committee’ every two months and a report to
the ‘Leadership’ every six months. The officials are constantly moved around and live
with families (enabling mutual control of family and activist), and are not allowed to
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marry. Anyone wishing to leave the PKK may do so provided that they cease all political
activity, and in the 1980s failure to respect this rule resulted on occasions in death (see
Kutschera 2000 and especially Marcus 2007: 88-96).
 
III. Forms of submission and ways of assessing it
Institutional configuration, roles, and domination
31 It is now clear that the highly codified attitudes, behaviour, and roles result from the
‘institutional  configuration’26 at  work  in  the  PKK  since  1986  –  the  way  measures,
knowledge, techniques, and activities are organised. The 3rd Congress in 1986 did not
simply set up an Academy in charge of educating activists in certain rules and norms, it
also introduced, on the one hand, an internal promotion system based on loyalty to the
leader and his values – independently of the political skills of the activists – and on the
other hand placed Öcalan above everyone else in the position of just, infallible, and
unassailable judge.
32 Initially conceived of as a party for and of the workers, the PKK started slanting its
pronouncements towards the peasantry once the armed struggle had begun. The slogan
of the 3rd Congress shows this change, with the participants in Bekaa proclaiming that
‘the peasants are in power.’ Whilst this slogan was intended to draw the peasantry to
the party’s cause, since they were the large majority of the population in the Kurdish
regions of  Turkey,  it  also corresponded to a desire to promote peasants within the
organisation  (Çelik  2002:  112),  and  thereby  sideline  educated  and/or  experienced
activists able to contest Öcalan’s leadership. Many activists from peasant backgrounds,
with no prior political skills,27 and unable to read or write, were rapidly promoted up
through the party ranks (sometimes overnight),28 becoming members of the Central
Committee thanks to their  military exploits  but  above all  their  loyalty.  Conversely,
experienced commanders could be demoted after a self-criticism session lasting only a
few minutes, then judged and condemned to death if found guilty of treason.
33 One consequence of this policy was the radical devaluing of intellectual and political
skills within the party. The PKK leader himself frequently criticised activists who joined
the  party  in  the  early  1990s  ‘on  leaving  universities  and  schools  poisoned  by  the
bourgeoisie’ (Özcan 2006: 211), for ‘true’ intellectuals consisted uniquely in ‘those who
unconditionally praise Abdullah Öcalan’ (quoted in Cigerli; Le Saout 2005: 132). From
the 3rd Congress on, the party’s ‘general secretariat’ was replaced by the ‘Leadership,’
now separated into two, a ‘strategic Leadership’ and a ‘tactical Leadership.’ Öcalan is
the  de  facto holder  of  the  ‘strategic  Leadership’  (but  he  rapidly  had  himself  called
simply ‘Leadership,’ Önderlik) and is in charge of all the key political directions, while
the ‘tactical Leadership’ is entrusted to the members of the Central Committee who
carry out the technical implementation of Öcalan’s decisions. This way of operating
takes all responsibility for implementing Öcalan’s policies out of his own hands, and the
members of  the Central  Committee always have to  justify  and explain any of  their
problems or failures (Çelik 2002: 109-111).
34 And  thus truth ,  in  the  sense  of  pronouncements  held  to  be  true  within  the  party
(Foucault  1994:  112),  has  always  and  can  only  come  from  Öcalan,  especially  since
activists very often understand nothing at all  about his theory and so feel they are
incompetent at expressing themselves.29 Öcalan – as ‘Leadership,’ ‘President’ (Serok or
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Rehber), ‘guide,’ and ‘Sun’ – has become one with the party’s martyrs, who endow him
with  him  legitimacy  and  sense  of  sacrifice.  He  has  undisputed  monopoly  on  the
definition and interpretation of the truth (gerçeklik), of the ‘reality’ Kurds experience,
as well as of the ‘reality’ of each activist. He alone ‘is’ the key to liberation – as opposed
to just possessing it – and able to judge the level of investment required of each person
if they are to become a true Man. The problem is that this ideal level of investment is
necessarily out of reach – unless they sacrifice themselves as the ‘emblematic’ martyrs
have  done  before  them.  It  is  thus  not  rare  to  hear  PKK  activists under-appreciate
themselves,  state  that  they  have  been  lacking  in  faith  (in  the  ‘Leadership’  and  in
themselves). The solution that Öcalan recommends is total submission to the truth as
revealed by him, and compliance to the principles of his own life in the life of the
activists - the disciplining of body and mind. But even those who follow his principles
and his way of life may fall short and be deemed ‘prostitutes’ (fahişe), ‘crooked’ (alçak)
and ‘slavish’ (Öcalan 1994: 505, Serxwebûn June 1998, Ballı  1991: 282 quoted in Özcan
2006: 208-209, 187).
35 This specific and lasting institutional configuration – which shifted further towards the
person of Öcalan between 1986 and 1999 – was intended to result in the ‘creation’ of
just two main ‘roles’  within the party -  guide and disciple.  Sidelined from any true
political  issues,  activists  were  not  required  to  acquire  any  specific  know-how  or
practical knowledge other than integrating Öcalan’s pronouncements and submitting
to their  leader’s  discipline.  It  is  true that  there are different institutional  positions
within the PKK - activist, takim, manga, bölük, and tabur commander (army units), sector
and regional chief, and member of the Academy board, the European Central board,
and  the  Central  Committee.  But  all  activists  had  to  behave  in  the  same  way  and
incorporate a similar attitude system - and this independently of their positions within
the hierarchy.30 Additionally, the insistence on destroying one’s ‘former personality’
sought to suppress any tendency certain activists or categories of activist might have
(men, women, people from cities, Europe, universities, a family that did not declare
itself to be Kurdish, etc.) to not ‘adhere to’ the role assigned to them (Lagroye; François;
Sawicki 2002: 144).
36 But  nevertheless,  as  Goffman  (1991)  observes,  individuals  retain  considerable
autonomy  in  the  role  they  have  to  adhere  to,  even  in  total  institutions.  Certain
commanders  used  the  aura  Öcalan  conferred  on  them  to  expand  their  role  and
establish their own power, something which was subsequently vigorously condemned
by the movement.31 Equally, certain activists of peasant origin considered themselves
to be intellectuals after writing a book or article (Çelik 2002: 112), before being rapidly
called to order by their comrades (criticising), and required to carry out their own self-
criticism.  More  importantly,  certain  commanders  in  the  mountains  or  in  prison
enjoyed a certain aura, such as Mehmet Can Yüce who was imprisoned from 1980 to
1999 and highly admired by some of the students who joined the party in the early
1990s, showing firstly that it is a lot harder to control and sanction ‘transgressive’32
behaviour  outside  the  total  institution  of  the  Mahsum  Korkmaz  Academy,  and,
secondly, that the Academy in fact considerably facilitated learning how to play the
role of disciple. Finally and most significantly, the observations and interviews carried
out in researching this article tend to show that there are almost as many ways of
relating to the role one is  called upon to ‘adhere to’ as  there are individuals,  even
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though certain factors tend to explain the attachment some feel for the institution, and
certain situations can explain why others are dissatisfied and take their distance.
 
Accepting, refusing, and negotiating one’s role within the institution
37 How  do  activists  and  sympathisers  place  their  trust  in  the  institution  and  entrust
themselves  to  it  (or  the  contrary)?  How  do  they  manage  to  adapt  to  disciplinary
measures (or not)? It is of course impossible to assess the proportion of activists who
overall accept their role, and what proportion tends not to. But whilst there is nothing
to suggest that the training and education provided within the party are effective and
necessarily  fulfil  their  goals,33 the  sheer  number  of  disciplinary  methods  described
above and the weight accorded to them suggest that it is impossible for an activist to
remain outside the ‘PKK system.’  More specifically,  each activist  is  explicitly  called
upon to position him - or herself, both publically and internally, in relation to their
allotted role within the specific institutional configuration. There is of course no way of
knowing whether the activists truly think what they say, just as activists have no way
of  adopting  an  alternative  discourse  to  that  of  the  hierarchy,  as  shown  by  initial
interviews with pro-PKK associations in Europe carried out by the author, and initial
observations of events.
38 After  having  met  a  large  number  of  still  active  activists  and  sympathisers,  it  was
decided  to  conduct  interviews  with  several  ex-activists  and  ex-sympathisers
(sometimes  doing  the  ‘same’  interview  a  few  months  later),  so  as  to  gather  more
considered, changing, and often more critical testimony. It was also decided to try to
meet (ex-)activists and (ex-)sympathisers in a more neutral setting than the premises
of  pro-PKK  associations  (bars,  the  street,  and  the  homes  of  the  interviewees  or
interviewer), and this proved to be very fruitful (for instance, what still active activists
had  to  say  varied  significantly  with  the  setting).  Without  going  over  in  detail  the
individual trajectories of the people encountered,34 it is worth providing a summary of
the results of this study and trying to highlight a certain number of factors which can
induce individuals to entrust themselves to the institution or on the other hand to
question the role assigned to them.
39 First of all, are there any dispositions likely to encourage attachment to the PKK and
submission to the ideal of commitment recommended by Öcalan? Interviews tended to
show that Alevi Kurds experience greater difficulty in feeling wholly in tune with an
organisation considered to be predominantly Sunni, and they often tend to feel their
Kurdishness to be less natural and hence do not systematically link their fate to that of
the PKK, unlike some Sunni activists.35 Yet if Hamit Bozarslan (1997) and Paul White
(2000) are correct, the vast majority of those in Öcalan’s party in the 1990s were Sunni
Kurds, from the Kurdish-majority regions in Turkey, with little cultural and economic
capital  (peasants in villages or else having recently moved to towns).  It  would thus
seem that  primary socialisation in rural  regions where Kurds were in the minority
resulted  in  a  lower  predisposition  to  commitment  and  to  entrusting  oneself  to  the
party,  due  especially  to  the  history  of  these  regions  (which  were  less  marked  by
repression and attempts to assimilate populations via schooling) as well as to the fact
that the PKK only built up its presence here later on, meaning it was less frequently
seen as a ‘naturally’ legitimate representative.
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40 This ‘predisposition’ hypothesis is highly schematic, though. Some of the Sunni Kurdish
activists encountered were dissenters, whilst some of the Alevi Kurdish activists and
sympathisers saw themselves as ‘fanatics’ at times (one of them for instance said that
he thought of himself a leaf on the PKK tree, and another explained how she had cried
when Öcalan was arrested). Equally, a certain number of students and individuals from
wealthy  backgrounds  stated  they  had  always  felt  ‘in  their  right  place’  within  the
institution,  and  explained  how  they  were  seeking  to  give  shape  to  a  new  form  of
humanity within themselves with great self-abnegation. They said, for example, that
they  felt  guilty  not  to  be  doing  enough  for  the  cause,  explaining  that  they  were
determined to ‘leave their slavish mentality behind,’ and that they were terrified of
their inner enemies and disgusted by the ‘plot’ against Apo, etc.
41 In addition,  the context in which they joined the party (out of  necessity in prison,
under the threat of a forced marriage, or else eagerly awaited for whatever reason) as
well  as  time  spent  in  various  branches  of  the  institution  (the  Mahsum  Korkmaz
Academy,  the  guerrilla,  prison,  etc.),  would  seem  to  attenuate  or  exacerbate  the
predispositions  generated  by  primary  socialisation  and  sometimes  create  a  new
disposition to accept one’s role. All the interviews suggest that it is a lot easier to retain
one’s autonomy either in the big Turkish towns, where the party has sometimes found
it  hard  to  establish  itself  and  where  anonymity  and  insufficient  means  of
communication preclude the homogenisation of activist practices and ethos, or in the
Kurdish regions not controlled by the guerrillas, where the norms of traditional social
networks can compete with those laid  down by the party.  Attending the Academy,
however, and meeting Öcalan there tend to encourage attachment to the party and
incite activists to adapt their personal trajectory to the expectations of the institution:
‘At the Academy it was like the sun at midnight. [...] Öcalan was very knowledgeable
and even said that when you’re doing the washing-up, playing football, or eating,
you need to think of the people. He was already adult when he was a child… For
example, he said to us: “You don’t need to be a man now. You need to think like a
woman,  for  men  only  fight  for  power.  But  women  love  nature,  trees,  the
mountains...  That is how you can become a true patriot.” [...]  Öcalan has always
found a solution. When he puts forward a new strategy, I am never surprised and I
accept it.’ (Interview with ex-combatant but still active activist, Germany, 2004)36
42 Whilst commitment and maintaining commitment are dynamic processes, the degree
of  attachment to  the PKK and acceptance of  partisan discipline change (sometimes
radically) over time, in the light of the length of time and experiences as an activist,
evolutions in the conflict with the Turkish State (cessation of fighting in 1998), and
transformations within the organisation (the arrest of Öcalan in 1999). For example, it
is not rare to hear certain ex-activists still close to the PKK say they used to have entire
faith in Öcalan but that nowadays he has betrayed the cause, that there is no longer any
place for their skills within the party, that the PKK is not what it used to be, etc. This
dissatisfaction  may  be  directly  related  to  the  role  they  were  assigned  within  the
organisation,  as  for  one  ex-combatant  who was  sent  to  join  the  guerrillas  without
receiving training at the Academy and who was initially an enthusiastic activist:
‘The problem was that I didn’t like their policies. I trusted them but... I had joined
to help people. But it wasn’t the case once you got there, you’re not allowed to
question Öcalan’s orders. You’re not free... If there were a Kurdish State it would be
like the PKK... [...] You have to conduct your self-criticism and there’s a meeting
every week for that. Every 45 days there are regional meetings where we talked
about life among the guerrillas. Some people stood up and criticised you and you
The Production of the New Man Within the PKK
European Journal of Turkish Studies , Complete List
13
defended yourself and did your own self-criticism. And they thought self-criticism
was good…’ (Interview with an ex-combatant, Germany, 2003)
43 But dissatisfaction can also result from changes to the PKK and have an impact on the
way people fulfil their roles. In such a coercive system, it is a complex task to manage
the  gap  in  expectations  between  the  individuals  and  the  institution.  Roles  can  be
affected by people according themselves a certain leeway (taking a critical  distance
whilst  displaying  one’s  loyalty),  arriving  at  partial  and  temporary  cognitive
accommodations  (resignation  combined  with  dissatisfaction),  or  outright  rejections
(which if they do not lead to desertion or suicide can be severely sanctioned). And the
‘Leadership’  is  well  aware of  this,  and regularly  reminds people  that  ‘behind every
activist there lies hidden a prior traitor personality,’ and places greater emphasis on
daily  practices  almost (discipline  has  to  be  incorporated)  than  on  its  own
pronouncements (which can remain fairly obscure).
44 No doubt intermediary courses exist too, such as taking ‘ratchet effects’ (that restrain
ability  of  processes  to  be  reversed  once  a  specific  stage  is  reached) into  account ,
strategies to delay decisions,  or open states of  depression,  which oblige activists  to
work  on  themselves  so  as  to  cope  with  the  present  situation.  The  fact  that  the
institution takes full charge of everyday activities also makes it possible not to find
time to come up with alternative life scenarios and to stave off until later any decision
that  could  affect  one’s  trajectory.  For  most  of  the  ex-activists  interviewed,  what
enabled them to question their commitment to the party was an event that broke the
institution’s  regulated  organisation  of  time  (being  wounded  in  combat,  having  to
quickly migrate to Europe, experiencing the arrest of Öcalan).  Finally and no doubt
most importantly, activists and sympathisers are far from resenting the ‘entirety’ of
the  PKK system.  Most  of  the  time,  like  any  schoolchild  or  student,  they  like  some
lessons and some practices and find others uninteresting, unpalatable, or contrary even
to what they still think – but this does not stop them from ‘feeling in place’ within the
institution.
45 But it is also sometimes possible to negotiate one’s role, providing one has sufficient
resources. Having in-depth knowledge of the organisation, especially having brothers
who were part of the first cohort of activists and who knew the founders, means one
can ‘speak the same language’ as party officials and reach an agreement with them.
Equally, coming from a wealthy family providing financial backing to the PKK makes it
easier to sort out any areas of dispute with the organisation, especially when this is
combined with ‘sufficient’ symbolic capital acquired during time with the PKK (“having
already given a lot’):
‘[In 1998 the PKK wanted to send this activist to join the guerrillas but she did not
want to go]. They said to me “if you don’t want to go to the mountains then you
can’t stay and work with us.” Nobody said hello to me any more [...], they saw me as
a traitor.  And they tried to frighten me.  [...]  [In  another town in Germany]  my
family had done a lot to help [the local pro-PKK association], and given perhaps
50,000DM ... And since they are a fairly important and powerful family they said to
the PKK: “if something happens to D., we’ll hold you responsible.” And they left me
in peace. A year later they got back in touch and came to see me. And I started
going  to  the  association  once  again.  Some  people  understood  my  reasons,  but
others did not. They wanted to stop my friends from seeing me, but they stood up
for me. In any case, I haven’t been involved in politics [as I was before] after 1998.’
(Interview with an ex-activist, still a PKK sympathiser, Germany, 2004)
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46 The interviews carried out thus show that various factors (predispositions, the fact of
attending various branches of the institution, situational logics, economic resources,
social capital, etc.) can interact (often in contradictory or seemingly illogical ways) to
encourage  or  discourage  activists  from  assuming  roles  within  the  PKK.  It  is  thus
possible that the disciplinary measures set up by the party may have had very different
effects on different activists. Nevertheless, it was observed that those who have now
withdrawn from the PKK, who are dissidents, or who are more critical, often still bear
the marks of their time with the party (attitudes, lifestyles, vocabulary, principles, and
so on) long after leaving the institution. Whilst it is not possible to come up with a
quantitative assessment of the extent to which these measures worked, the evidence
suggests that they had lasting effects on a large number of activists, influencing both
their perception of the world and their post-activist daily life.
 
Conclusion
47 This study has shown how the PKK institution demands certain forms of practice and
behaviour of its members, and presented the measures put in place to monitor, control,
and sometimes punish deviant individuals who failed to conform to the theory of the
New Man. There is also some indication that these measures work at least partially in
different activist circles, and even with some sympathisers, who accept that their son
or daughter go off to the mountains. It is of course extremely difficult to ascertain to
what  extent  activists  and  sympathisers  accept,  integrate,  and  legitimate  their  role
within  the  institution  on  the  one  hand,  and  understand,  support,  and legitimate
practices and measures intended to homogenise these practices on the other. But it
would seem that many individuals did accept the role assigned to them, and this to
such an extent that they became ‘agents’ [Fr. actants] rather than actors, instruments at
the service of a higher power rather than participants in a common cause.
48 At the same time, this article has shown that certain commanders have managed to
create a certain degree of leeway for themselves and that sanctions have sometimes
been taken against reluctant activists,  showing that PKK members could also fail  or
refuse  to  conform  to  the  institution’s  demands  (due  to  their  ethnic  and  religious
identity for instance), or try to alter their role. It would seem that certain resources
predating their joining the PKK (their social,  cultural,  and economic capital) or else
acquired  within  the  movement  (symbolic  capital)  sometimes  enable  activists  to
negotiate  with  the  institution,  even  after  having  attended  certain  highly  coercive
components  of  the  institution  (the  Mahsum  Korkmaz  Academy,  the  guerrilla,  or
prison).  These  observations,  showing  that  the  subservience  of  individuals  to  the
institution and its leader can vary, help explain why it can seem inappropriate to view
the  PKK  via  preconceived  categories.  Analysing  the  relationship  between  Öcalan’s
organisation and its activists is in fact a matter of analysing the encounter between an
institution  and  a  multitude  of  individuals  with  sometimes  very  different  activist
experiences.
49 Lastly, this article has shown that the institutional configuration of the PKK seems to
have been very stable since 1986. However, the arrest of Öcalan in 1999 amounted to an
unprecedented  institutional  crisis,  bringing  with  it  the  risk  that  the  party  would
rapidly disintegrate as the roles set up within the PKK were now null and void. This is
no  doubt  why  the  Turkish  army  authorised  Öcalan  to  send  ‘instructions’  to  his
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movement  via  his  lawyers,  and  what  led  the  commanders,  after  a  few  weeks  of
hesitation, to re-elect Öcalan as party leader. Since then loyalty to Apo has primarily
involved mental and physical discipline, seen as the only means of carrying forward the
‘combat for civilisation.’ The ‘regime of truth’ (Lagroye 2006: 142) at work within the
PKK, or ‘regime of proof’ as Paul Veyne (1983) calls it, would thus seem to have been
preserved, at least for the large majority of activists and sympathisers – if Öcalan still
believes in these truths, then that means they are still true.
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NOTES
1. One may also trace the intellectual origins of the “New Man”, however, to early Christian
writings.
2. The only study in French (of which the author is aware) that seeks to analyse the theory of the
New  Man  in  a  Marxist  party  prior  to  the  October  Revolution  is  that  by  Ducoulombier
(Ducoulombier 2007).
3. This  observation  does  not  hold  to  quite  the  same  extent,  however,  in  studies  of  the
“communist world”.
4. A repertoire of collective action is defined by Charles Tilly as the range of actions used by a
movement in its interactions with third parties. It is true that some examples show that certain
ideas can easily be “put into practice” (such as Gandhi’s repertoire of non-violence), but analysis
always reveals a certain shortfall between theory and practice due to constraints arising from
any situation in which interaction takes place.
5. Their  environment  of  course  still  influences  radical  organisations:  “opposing”  often  also
means  “maintaining contact  with”,  especially  when what  the  organisation is  trying to  bring
about is a transformation of this environment (ideological imitation, for example). Putting into
practice  a  theory intended strictly  for  internal  use  (the desire  to  transform activists)  would
appear  to  be  less  affected  by  the  relationship  to  the  external  environment  when  there  are
substantial symbolic and material frontiers cutting across the social organisation (clandestine
status,  camps  abroad  or  in  the  mountains,  being  obliged  to  choose  one’s  “camp”,  etc.).  See
Garner;  Zald  1987  on  the  distinction  between  exclusive  movements  (requiring  considerable
activist involvement) and inclusive movements (where activist involvement is far less valued) on
the one hand and, on the other, organisations seeking primarily to change activists or else more
widely bring about social change.
6. The PKK, led by Abdullah Öcalan since 1978, has been engaged in a guerrilla war against the
Turkish  state  since  1984.  The  leader  of  the  PKK was  arrested in  1999  but  still  “advises”  his
organisation from prison. A recent assessment by the Chief of the General Staff, İlker Başbuğ,
puts the number of deaths from the conflict at 44,000 (Hürriyet, 16/09/2008).
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7. See for instance Bozarslan 2004, Grojean 2006, and Grojean 2008: 581-640 for discussion of this
issue.
8. Any hypothesis as to the nature of the PKK organisation (“ terrorist”, “sectarian”, “total”,
“totalitarian”,  or  else  on  the  contrary  “national  liberation  movement”  or  “freedom  fighters
organisation”)  runs  the  risk  of  becoming self-confirming as  the  argument  unfolds,  and thus
legitimating the frameworks through which the various protagonists perceive their own actions.
9. In the PKK, activists – clandestine members of the party involved on a full-time basis in its
political or military wing – are also officials (there are only about 150 in Germany and twenty or
so in  France for  instance, cf.  Cigerli;  Le  Saout  2005:  153),  whereas  sympathisers, who are not
members of the clandestine organisation – though some are involved full-time in legal, pro-PKK
associations (in which case they live in the same way as activists) – can be simply members of these
associations in Europe (it is estimated that there are about 11,000 in this situation in Germany
today) or else militiamen in Turkey (illegally helping the guerrillas),  or else may only provide
more indirect support (such as financial support or only taking part periodically in the activity of
legal associations). In principle, European activists are only associated with the political branch
of the party, but a certain number of former combatants, some of whom are still active, others
not, also live in Europe. The author met over one hundred people belonging or having belonged
to these categories, and carried out more in-depth biographical interviews with 38 of them.
10. It might here seem that nothing can replace observing activist practice in situ. But apart from
the fact that such an approach within a clandestine organisation at war might actually pose more
methodological  problems  than  it  solves,  such  a  method  could  well  lead  to  the  over-hasty
conclusion  that  theory  and  practice  coincide  perfectly,  since  coercive  measures  and  mutual
surveillance within the institution tend to lead people to “adhere’ more closely to their role in
the presence of a researcher.
11. Some people claim that the Kurds were the first people to have mastered horse breeding, and
that they invented mathematics and the telescope. Cf. “Cemşid Bender’le Kürt tarihi üzerine...”
[With Cemşid Bender on Kurdish history], 1995, pp. 9, quoted in Hirschler 2002: 73-74.
12. The German edition only includes the second and third part of the Turkish edition, as stated
in its Preface.
13. A similar phenomenon occurred in Germany and Italy in the 1970s. Cf. Della Porta 1995: 85.
14. The Çözümlemeler started in 1986, when the Academy was founded. They are long speeches
providing  the  basis  for  activist  training  and  published  as  works  up  to  six  years  after  being
written.
15. It is true that there are conflicting interpretations and even different “trends” within the
PKK movement, but racial and biological concepts of identity dominate nonetheless. Cf. Hirschler
2002: 75.
16. “There is  no doubt  that  the Kurds have to  some extent  been fighting themselves,  in  an
internal war, a war over people’s minds”. Cf. “Bei den Kurden hat eine erstaunliche Revolution
stattgefunden...”, 2001.
17. In the same way as the Turkish people, who stand out for their masculinity, have colonised
and enslaved the Kurdish people,  Kurdish men have colonised and enslaved Kurdish women.
Since the “traditional” masculine personality traits were associated with domination, violence,
superiority, and arrogance, male PKK activists needed to free themselves from this sort of way of
living and behaving and adopt the personality of the New Man, whose characteristics – inspired
by those of the “free” woman – are peace, communion with nature, culture, “sociality”, and a
sense of patriotic duty. Since personal responsibility and perfection are the only ways to reach
Öcalan, activist men and women are to leave their gender behind them together with its harmful
attributes so as to better follow Öcalan – who wishes to become the leader of a ‘party of [free]
women” – and reach a truly human status.  See Koç 1993a and 1993b,  Öcalan 1993 and more
generally Öcalan 1992.
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18. Since 1999, the “struggle for democratic civilisation” has conjoined socialist and democratic
ideology - rebaptised “Apoism’ (in reference to Öcalan’s nickname, Apo, that is “Uncle”) - cultural
demands (not nationalist demands) and the theory of the New Man. Cf. Öcalan 2003.
19. In  1991  lessons included  the  history  of  Kurdistan,  resistance,  the  party,  and  Marxism-
Leninism,  knowing the  enemy,  special  war  methods,  and techniques  for  political  unrest  and
mobilisation (cf.  Arbeitskreis  Internationalismus Bonn et  al.,  “Alltag in der Mahsum Korkmaz
Akademie”  1991:  7).  In  1995  the  syllabus  was  expanded  to  include philosophy  lessons  (both
“world” and party philosophy), and lessons in art, culture, religion, education, woman’s role in
the family, and behaviour (Solina 1997: 326).
20. “12 September” personality refers to the behaviour and way of life of certain activists who
grew up after the 1980 coup. They are accused of being westernised, having a vastly diminished
sense of responsibility, and being very individualistic. “Convict’ personality corresponds to that
of activists imprisoned after 12 September, and involves over-familiarity with the Leadership, a
lack of respect for Öcalan, and a tendency to resist discipline. Cf. Arbeitskreis Internationalismus
Bonn  et  al.,  “Gerichtsverhandlung  in  der  Mahsum  Korkmaz  Akademie”,  1991:  40-41  and
Çürükkaya 1997: 79, 85, 91.
21. Stolen glances towards a friend of the opposite sex may be considered to be signs of desire.
Cf. Çürükkaya 1997: 124.
22. Arbeitskreis Internationalismus Bonn et al. 1991: 40-41. Two “12 September” repeat offenders
are described in this article, a man who refused to follow the military part of training and a
former radical left-wing activist suspected of being an “agent” sent by the Turkish State.
23. Charges were brought against Çürükkaya himself after he had organised the elections to the
Kurdish parliament in exile in Europe along lines that displeased the “Leadership’” (1992). He
subsequently fled and has since lived in hiding in Germany.
24. The measures studied here are intended primarily for members of the organisation, but the PKK
has also sought to apply a certain number of rules to its sympathisers and more generally the
population,  although this is the case only in places where there was the will to do so and the
capability (Kurdish regions in Syria and Iraq,  “liberated zones” in Turkey, and in Europe via
numerous legal Kurdish associations).
25. As  there  tend  to  be  fewer  women,  their  groups  are  sometimes  controlled  by  several
organisations (the PKK, TKP-ML, and DHKP-C for example).
26. The notion of configuration is taken from Elias (Elias 1978) and “conveys the plasticity of the
relationships  between  various  analysable  processes,  and  so  makes  it  easier  to  understand
changes which though not modifying the overall architecture can nevertheless have an effect on
its signification” (Lagroye 2006: 132).
27. “Trigger events” (the assassination of a member of the family, the imprisonment of a father,
etc.) were often their sole form of political experience and many were purely out for vengeance.
28. Interview with a former PKK guerrilla, Germany, June 2004.
29. The guerrillas often find it extremely hard to understand the theoretical lessons due to their
low level  of  cultural  capital  and also to language problems (some do not speak Turkish,  the
principal working language in the party).
30. See  Lagroye  1997,  for  discussion  of  the  difference  between  institutional  “positions”  and
“roles”.
31. The main commander targeted by such criticism was Şemdin Sakık (Zeki), who was accused of
having behaved like an “agha” and whose name was used to designate a category of practices to
be  avoided.  The  names  of  other  commanders  were  used  for  other  categories  of  deviant
behaviour. Cf. Flach 2003: 100, 117, 134, 153-154, 169, 182.
32. “Transgressive”, but not “deviant” (in the sense used by Becker 1985): until 1998, Mehmet
Can Yüce pledged full allegiance to Öcalan.
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33. The  possibility  of  true  self-fulfilment  within  the  institution  independently  of  any  coercion
should not be excluded either (cf. Lagroye; Siméant 2003).
34. The numerous itineraries of the activists and sympathisers interviewed is not developed here
due to lack of space. For more details, see Grojean 2103b.
35. This is less the case for Alevi Kurds who migrated to Europe before joining the party.
36. But Öcalan’s charismatic domination is felt far beyond Germany. Amongst those interviewed,
most  of  the  activists  and  many of  the  sympathisers  who are  still  committed  see  him as  an
extraordinary  being,  with  boundless  intelligence  (“he  revolutionised  world  philosophy”),
outstanding  political  far-sightedness  (“he  was  the  only  one  to  have  anticipated  the  coup  in
1980”), an enormous capacity for work (“he only sleeps five hours a night and can talk for eight
hours non-stop”), with unrivalled love and understanding for his activists (“he never forgets the
face of someone he has spoken to”), of unique generosity and humanity (“the greatest pacifist in
the world”), etc. (Interviews with PKK activists, former activists and sympathisers, Germany and
France, 2001-2005).
ABSTRACTS
Scholars  have  analyzed theories  of  the  ‘New Man’  primarily  as  an  ideological  component  of
totalitarian  systems.  Based  on  the  study  of  the  Kurdistan  Workers’  Party  (PKK),  the  most
important organization of the Kurdish movement in Turkey, this article goes beyond the frame
of state ideologies to examine the relationships between theory and practice, and to evaluate the
concrete  effects  of  the  New  Man  doctrine  on  PKK  activists.  The  article  examines  political
discourses  within  the  PKK  to  help  to  understand  how,  beyond  Marxism  and  nationalism,  a
specific construction of the New Man was institutionalized in the party. The party used a number
of disciplinary mechanisms to do this; in particular, self-criticism played an important role in all
branches of the organization. Evaluating the efficacy of these measures is difficult, but the article
suggests that activists’ personal biographies and social trajectories help explain how and why
some militants were (or were not) able to conform to the PKK ideal.
Les chercheurs ont surtout analysé les théories de l’« Homme nouveau » en tant que composante
idéologique des systèmes totalitaires. Fondée sur l’étude du Parti des Travailleurs du Kurdistan
(PKK), la plus importante organisation du mouvement kurde de Turquie, cet article dépasse le
cadre des idéologies d’Etat pour analyser les relations entre théories et pratiques, et pour évaluer
les  effets  concrets  de  la  doctrine  de  l’Homme nouveau sur  les  activistes  du PKK.  Cet  article
examine donc les discours politiques au sein du PKK afin de comprendre comment, au delà du
marxisme et du nationalisme, s’est institutionnalisée une construction spécifique de l’Homme
nouveau au sein de l’organisation. A cette fin, le parti a utilisé un certain nombre de dispositifs
disciplinaires : l’autocritique a notamment joué un rôle très important dans toutes les branches
de l’organisation.  Evaluer l’efficacité de ces dispositifs  est  difficile,  mais  l’article  suggère que
l’étude  des  trajectoires  biographiques  des  individus  engagés  permet  de  mieux  comprendre
pourquoi  et  surtout  comment  certains  militants  ont  pu  (ou  pas)  se  conformer  aux  idéaux
développés par le PKK.
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